ProLog Gil Slonim

Prolog Gil Slonim WC 829

My ringside seat at the point of contact in the far reaching maritime war in the Pacific was hardly pre-ordained. It took some footwork to get there; and to stay.

This starts with a report that emphasizes that all of the hostility and conflict was hardly directed at the ‘real enemy’ the Japs. When Halsey sailed out of port for America’s first offensive strike against the Marshalls, Eddie Layton, Admiral Nimitz’s Intelligence Officer, decided he’d better have somebody around who spoke Japanese. The idea stood on its own. He and Joe Rochefort agreed to send Banks Holcolm, a genial Marine Major who was a fellow language officer in Tokyo from 1939 to August 23, 1941, when we hastened to get on our way, approximately three months before the sneak attack against Pearl Harbor. They wanted to test the waters as to how Radio Intelligence (R.I.) units could be factored into the forces at sea, backing up the Task Force Commanders in their decision making, in tactical situations with the local intelligence they could gain on the spot, where the guns were firing, and planes zoomed in for bombing, strafing and torpedo attacks.

Banks proved so helpful to Vice Admiral Halsey & his staff, even though he had no radiomen with him, that upon their return to their Ford Island moorings in Pearl Harbor, the Admiral told Banks, “Go back and tell your boss you are now on my staff permanently.” Neither Halsey nor his mercurial chief of staff, Captain Miles Browning, was too bashful in this regard. And at the start of hostilities the formality of orders form the Bureau of Navigation gave way to more flexible administrative methodology. But Layton and Rochefort had strong reservations, at the time it was estimated that there were 35 officers qualified in the Japanese language. Both Layton and Rochefort had desultory visions of all being fanned out to individual commanders in the Fleet, and the problem created was there would be nobody left to work on the code breaking that went on at Pearl, Washington and Corregidor. They reasoned, “If every Admiral in the Fleet should successfully insist upon having their own Japanese interpreter assigned to his staff, who would be left to work on codes and communications analysis!”

They insisted that Halsey’s demand must be resisted. This brought Miles Browning and Eddie Layton into direct conflict. Joe and Eddie put their minds together, and decided they would cut a deal with Halsey. Each time that he set to sea for an offensive operation they would assign an R.I. unit (which would include specially trained radiomen) to him personally. But when he returned, the people in the Unit would return to FRUPAC. But Holcomb was not available. This word got around in FRUPAC as well as in the Fleet. I decided I wanted, in the worst way, to get to sea. Obviously, this could be my chance. I decided at the time, if I was to be the one, I’d better be on the same watch section as Joe Rochefort in our round the clock vigil in the basement of the 14^th Naval District in Pearl Harbor.

I analyzed the pattern just as we did with Japanese communications intercepts. I figured that one night Eddie Layton would call and say, “Halsey needs somebody to go to sea with him.” I wanted to be right there to raise my hand with all the enthusiasm I could muster for Joe would make the decision right then and there. He wasn’t one who had to brood things over before he acted. He made up his mind quickly. I had a strong urge to get back aboard ship, and it looked very much like I was destined to remain at a desk for the duration in that deep and gloomy Hawaiian basement.

I did not have the gift of code breakers’ persistence, nor their patience. The historic area left me cold. I wanted to make some history. It was the future that fascinated me. Besides, I was a naval officer. My training had prepared me for battle at sea. No self-respecting Naval Academy graduate would ever be satisfied to serve throughout an entire war behind a desk. Whether in Washington or in lovely Hawaii, it worked. My scheme of maneuver shifted into a high gear after shifting watches to Joe’s section for the 12 hour on – 12 hour off watches we stood. The call came, I could tell who he was talking to as he threw in a few well-chosen Japanese words (for instance) to punctuate his points. My hand was in his face before he could ask the question. The OK came nearly as swiftly.

Shipmate August 2006

WWII Prolog Cryptography

The following is Part I of a sea tale about the contribution of radio intelligence to Fleet operations; part II will be in the September issue of Shipmate.   Because of closely held security few senior officers understood radio intelligence and held it in disdain—thinking of it as a childish play thing.  After Pearl Harbor Mobile Radio Intelligence teams were sent to sea on Task Force Commander’s staffs.  (Some TF commanders still did not trust the junior officer who led his Mobile Team.)

During the doldrums of the 1920s a hand full of naval code breakers worked to penetrate Japanese codes and ciphers.   The breaking of Japan’s WE WE cipher, used in the former German islands in the Central Pacific mandated to Japan by the League of Nations,  disclosed that Japan was fortifying the islands.  Later the code breakers uncovered Japan had penetrated the Navy’s war plan Orange.  Cryptography non-believers began taking notice of these accomplishments.—some with control in mind. Our Classmate Gil Slonim entered the mysterious world Cryptology just before WW II.

The mission of cryptology is to acquire, evaluate and disseminate enemy radio traffic.  Originally the mission was in the office of Intelligence. (ONI). But it overlapped the Office of Communications (ONC) and (ONI).  Between the war years a feud developed between these two offices resulting in interdepartmental rivalry over which would control Cryptology.  The CNO gave custody of this infant to ONC because he did not trust ONI.  It is interesting that the CNO of the time condoned feuding with in his staff instead of ordering the feuders to come down with a joint position that the CNO could approve as naval policy.  Those who place their personal interests above the interest of the United States endanger the security of the Nation and adversely affect the Navy.  Before Midway another rivalry erupted when the office of War Plans joined the ONI-ONC feud. If it had not been for the strength of Admirals King and Nimitz the Midway battle would have been compromised.   Interdepartmental feuds have infected the Navy since time immemorial. It’s not the system it’s the people.

(Consider the rattle snake, a creature jealous of his territory.  If a passer by stays clears of the rattler’s domain he will be safe; but if he enters it the snake will strike.) 

The key to naval radio intelligence was a net work of listening stations covering the Pacific located for triangulation of intercepts. Message receiving evaluation and dissemination centers Op-20-G station Negat in the Navy Department, station Hypo in Hawaii and station Belconnen in Australia. Mobile radio Intelligence Units were assigned to fleet and task force commanders.

I am confused by the lexical of intelligence for it was derived from the         Greek word kryptos “hidden” and logos “word”. (It’s all Greek to me.) were originated by pioneer cryptographers and vary from dictionary versions.

The following definitions are to keep me sane.

                     

                                     The Arcane science of: Cryptology

                                    

                                   Cipher          Changes text word for word

                                   Code             Changes idea

                                             Cryptology    Methods of secret communication

                                                         Includes signal security, ones own

                                                          and nullifying enemy security

                                Cryptanalysis    traffic analysis

                                Cryptography    Encoding messages intended to be

                                                           decoded only by addressee.

                               

                                Cryptographic Section--code breakers headquarters

When an intercepted message cannot be read by cryptanalysis, it can yield important information by traffic analysis, not perfect but helpful.  By analyzing radio traffic the following deductions are possible: sender and receiver of messages, locations of transmissions (radio direction finding), transmission length, routing, traffic volume and precedent.

Gil was a language student in Tokyo in the late thirties but was sent home in 1941 because of the threat of war.  He was trained by the remarkable Joe Rochefort for Mobile Radio Intelligence Unit duty. When Joe thought him ready he was transferred with his mobile team to VADM Halsey’s TF 16 in time for the raid on Tokyo and duty in the Solomon Islands.   When VADM Halsey took over the South Pacific Command  in October 1942, RADM Kinkaid became  CTF16 in time for the carrier actions of the Eastern Solomons where Enterprise was damaged ( Gil lost a man and might have been killed had he not been with the admiral.); and of Santa Cruz Island.   His team was transferred to Saratoga that was torpedoed.  Next the team was transferred to Wasp via a destroyer.  Before they arrived Wasp was torpedoed.  Gil’s team was ordered to Pearl Harbor.  He got a flight to Pearl.  His crew had to hitch hike; with their heavy gear, they moved some twenty six times. This ends Part I.